

Message Text

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ACTION SS-25

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1968
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 3 GENEVA 8791

EXDIS USCTB

PASS TO DOE

E O 11652: XGDS-3
TAGS: PARM US UK UR
SUBJ: CTB NEGOTIATIONS: ASSESSMENT OF SECOND WEEK
(OCTOBER 10-14, 1977)

CTB MESSAGE NO29

SUMMARY: DURING SECOND WEEK OF CTB NEGOTIATIONS, THERE WERE NO APPARENT CHANGES IN THE POSITIONS OF THE THREE PARTICIPANTS. THERE IS CURRENTLY LITTLE EXPECTATION THAT SIGNIFICANT MOVEMENT WILL BE MADE ON ANY OF THE KEY SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES IN THE ABSENCE OF AN OVERALL RESOLUTION OF REMAINING PROBLEMS, PARTICULARLY QUESTION OF PNES. AMONG NOTABLE DEVELOPMENTS OF WEEK'S DISCUSSIONS WERE: FAVORABLE SOVIET REACTION TO US SUGGESTION FOR TWO-TRACK APPROACH TO CTB VERIFICATION; CONTINUED PRESENTATION OF STRONGLY CONFLICTING VIEWS ON PNES; SOVIET INTEREST IN TECHNICAL AND PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF AUTOMATIC SEISMIC INSTALLATIONS, WHILE STILL OBJECTING TO THEM IN PRINCIPLE; AND INDICATIONS THAT SOVIETS WOULD

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FALL OFF REQUIREMENT THAT ALL NUCLEAR POWERS JOIN A CTB FROM START PROVIDED OTHER ISSUES COULD BE RESOLVED.
END SUMMARY

1. DURING SECOND WEEK OF NEGOTIATIONS, AS DURING FIRST WEEK, THERE WERE NO DEPARTURES FROM EXISTING SOVIET POSITIONS ON ANY OF KEY SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES. LACK OF

MOVEMENT BY SOVIETS, TOGETHER WITH REPETITION OF ESTABLISHED US AND UK POSITIONS, HAS CONTRIBUTED TO A GROWING SENSE OF ENTRENCHMENT BY ALL THREE PARTICIPANTS. WHILE THERE HAVE BEEN SLIGHT HINTS OF SOVIET RECEPTIVITY ON CERTAIN VERIFICATION AND POLITICAL/LEGAL ISSUES (SEE BELOW), UK AND US DELS DOUBT THAT FORMAL SOVIET POSITIONS ON THESE MATTERS WILL BUDGE IN ABSENCE OF OVERALL RESOLUTION OF REMAINING PROBLEMS, INCLUDING PNES. MOREOVER, THERE IS LITTLE EXPECTATION ON PART OF ANY DELEGATION THAT BOTTLE-NECK CAN BE ELIMINATED IN ABSENCE OF POLITICAL LEVEL DECISIONS AND ACTIONS.

2. CHARACTER AND PACE OF TRILATERAL WORK HAS REFLECTED FEELING THAT LITTLE CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED DURING THIS ROUND OTHER THAN TO PRESENT AND FURTHER CLARIFY NATIONAL POSITIONS. PLENARY STATEMENTS HAVE GENERALLY REHEARSED STANDARD ARGUMENTS. ANIMATED, EXTEMPORANEOUS DEBATES THAT FILLED SUBSTANTIAL PART OF PLENARY MEETINGS DURING JULY TALKS HAVE HARDLY TAKEN PLACE SO FAR DURING PRESENT ROUND. PRIVATE, POST-PLENARY MEETINGS OF DELEGATION CHAIRMEN AND DEPUTIES HAVE BECOME RATHER BRIEF AND PERFUNCTORY. COURIOUSLY, MOROKHOV DOES NOT EVEN TRY TO INTRODUCE PNE ISSUE THERE. IN ADDITION, DESPITE WESTERN ATTEMPTS TO ORGANIZE SMALL GROUP DISCUSSIONS OF VERIFICATION AND POLITICAL/LEGAL MATTERS, SOVIETS HAVE SO FAR BEEN UNWILLING TO PARTICIPATE UNLESS WE WERE PREPARED

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TO SET UP A PNE WORKING GROUP (SEE SEPTTEL).

3. PERHAPS THE MOST POSITIVE DEVELOPMENT OF WEEK WAS FAVORABLE SOVIET REACTION TO US SUGGESTION FOR TWO-TRACK APPROACH TO CTB VERIFICATION, INVOLVING BILATERAL US-SOVIET VERIFICATION AGREEMENT TO SUPPLEMENT VERIFICATION PROVISIONS OF MULTILATERAL CTB. SOVIETS HAVE LONG PREFERRED TO WORK OUT DETAILS OF CTB TREATY ON A BILATERAL (OR TRILATERAL) BASIS. THEY WELCOME TWO-TRACK APPROACH AS A MEANS OF ENSURING THAT THE MOST SENSITIVE ASPECTS OF CTB (E.G. VERIFICATION) CAN BE NEGOTIATED AND IMPLEMENTED ON SUCH A BASIS, WHILE STILL ALLOWING THE CCD TO PLAY A ROLE ON LESS CENTRAL MATTERS.

4. BRITISH HAVE NOT YET GIVEN US A CONSIDERED REACTION TO THE TWO-TRACK APPROACH, AND HAVE NOT INDICATED WHAT ROLE, IF ANY, THEY MIGHT WISH TO PLAY IN THE SECOND (NON-MULTILATERAL) TRACK, WHETHER IN THE AREA OF AUTOMATIC SEISMIC INSTALLATIONS OR ON-SITE INSPECTIONS. UK DELOFFS HAVE INDICATED TO US THAT PROBLEM IS LARGELY A POLITICAL ONE FOR THEM. IN TERMS OF THEIR CONFIDENCE IN SOVIET COMPLIANCE, THEY COULD, OF COURSE, COUNT ON THE INFOR-

MATION WE WOULD PROVIDE THEM FROM US SEISMIC INSTALLATIONS AND INSPECTIONS ON SOVIET TERRITORY. BUT THEY POINT OUT THAT VERIFICATION, ESPECIALLY ON-SITE INSPECTION, HAS TRADITIONALLY BEEN AN IMPORTANT ELEMENT OF UK PUBLIC POSITION AND IT MIGHT BE POLITICALLY DIFFICULT FOR THEM TO APPEAR TO BE SITTING ON THE SIDELINES. FINANCIAL

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C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (PARA 6)

CONSIDERATIONS WOULD BE A FACTOR WORKING IN THE OPPOSITE DIRECTION. OPTIONS THAT THE BRITISH WILL PROBABLY CONSIDER RANGE FROM SITTING IT OUT ALTOGETHER TO PUSHING HARD FOR A TRILATERAL VERIFICATION AGREEMENT. IN THE MIDDLE ARE THE POSSIBILITIES OF CONCLUDING A SEPARATE AGREEMENT WITH THE SOVIETS AND OF PARTICIPATING IN SOME MANNER IN A US-SOVIET BILATERAL ARRANGEMENT (E.G., BY SENDING UK TECHNICIANS TO JOIN US-ORGANIZED INSPECTION TEAMS).

5. FOLLOWING PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS OF THE WEEK ON KEY SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES.

6. PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS (PNES). WE HAVE CONTINUED TO PRESS HARD ON THE PNE ISSUE, STRESSING IN PRIVATE CONVERSATIONS THAT MILITARY BENEFITS ARE INEVITABLE CONSEQUENCES OF CARRYING OUT PNES AND THAT CONSEQUENTLY WE CANNOT ENVISAGE A CTB TREATY PERMITTING THEM. BRITISH HAVE TAKEN EQUALLY TOUGH STAND, BOTH IN PRIVATE AND IN

STRONG PLENARY STATEMENT ON OCTOBER 14. HOWEVER, THERE

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HAS BEEN NO FLEXIBILITY IN THE SOVIET LINE EITHER, AS REFLECTED IN PLENARY STATEMENTS ON OCTOBER 11 AND 12 AND IN INFORMAL CONTACTS. IN SUCH INFORMAL CONTACTS, CERTAIN MEMBERS OF SOVIET DELEGATION HAVE SOUNDED THEME THAT WE CANNOT ELIMINATE BENEFITS OF PNE TECHNOLOGY "FOREVER", AND HAVE ASKED US TO PROVIDE SOLUTIONS TO PRESENT IMPASSE. THEY HAVE NOT, HOWEVER, EVEN HINTED AT COMPROMISE SOLUTIONS OF THEIR OWN. IF SOVIET CTB DELEGATION IS AWARE THAT -DEFERRAL" IDEA WAS RAISED DURING SEPTEMBER TALKS IN WASHINGTON, THERE HAVE BEEN NO REFERENCES TO IT HERE. US DEL CONSIDERS IT UNLIKELY, EVEN IF SOVIET DEL IS AWARE OF IDEA, THAT THEY WILL RAISE IT DURING PRESENT ROUND.

7. VERIFICATION. US DEL GAVE HIGH PRIORITY TO VERIFICATION THIS WEEK, ADDRESSING ON-SITE INSPECTIONS (OSI) AND AUTOMATIC SEISMIC INSTALLATIONS (ASIS) IN SEPARATE PLENARY STATEMENTS. ON QUESTION OF HOW A DETERMINATION WOULD BE MADE TO CARRY OUT OSIS (I.E., VOLUNTARY VS. MANDATORY ISSUE), WE HAVE SOUGHT TO ESTABLISH A STRONG BARGAINING POSITION BY EMPHASIZING DEFICIENCIES OF VOLUNTARY APPROACH AS CONTAINED IN SOVIET DRAFT TREATY AND CALLING FOR EXPLORATION OF ALTERNATIVE PROCEDURES. ON QUESTION OF METHOD OF CARRYING OUT OSI, WE STRESSED THAT DETAILED RIGHTS AND FUNCTIONS OF INSPECTION TEAMS SHOULD BE AGREED IN ADVANCE, AND WE ILLUSTRATED THE TYPES OF RIGHTS AND FUNCTIONS WE HAVE IN MIND. SOVIETS HAVE NOT YET REACTED TO OUR IDEAS, AND PLAN TO ADDRESS OSIS AT OCTOBER 17 PLENARY.

8. ALTHOUGH SOVIETS HAVE ADHERED TO THE LINE THAT ASIS ARE UNNECESSARY FOR ADEQUATE VERIFICATION AND WOULD INFRINGE ON SOVIET SOVEREIGNTY, TECHNICAL SPECIALISTS

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ON SOVIET DEL HAVE EXPRESSED INTEREST IN PRIVATE CONVERSATIONS IN TYPES OF INSTRUMENTS AND PROCEDURES WE HAVE IN MIND. (WE PLAN TO GIVE PRESENTATION ON THE MODALITIES OF ASI INSTALLATION AND OPERATION AT OCTOBER 17 PLENARY.) SOVIET DELEGATION MEMBERS HAVE PARTICULARLY WANTED TO KNOW HOW MANY STATIONS WE WANTED AND WHERE WE WANTED THEM LOCATED. WE HAVE TOLD THEM THOSE MATTERS ARE UNDER STUDY.

9. MOST INTERESTING DEVELOPMENT ON ASI QUESTION WAS REMARK BY MOROKHOV (GENEVA 8722) THAT, EVEN THOUGH SOVIET RELUCTANCE TO ACCEPT ASIS WAS A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE, IT WOULD MAKE A DIFFERENCE IN CONVINCING SOVIET GOVERNMENT WHETHER WE WERE SEEKING FIVE STATIONS OR A MUCH HIGHER NUMBER. IT IS OF COURSE TOO EARLY TO PREDICT EVENTUAL SOVIET POSITION ON ASIS. AND EXTENT TO WHICH SOVIET POSITION WILL DEPEND ON HOW OTHER ISSUES, INCLUDING PNES, ARE RESOLVED. IN ANOTHER DEVELOPMENT ON ASIS, US AND UK DELS HELD TECHNICAL DISCUSSIONS ON CONTRIBUTION OF SUCH INSTALLATIONS TO CTB VERIFICATION. CONCLUSION OF UK SIDE, WHICH THEY CONVEYED TO POLICY-LEVEL OFFICIALS IN LONDON, WAS THAT THERE ARE TECHNICAL GROUNDS FOR SUPPORTING ASI CONCEPT.

10. ENTRY INTO FORCE. US DEL DELIVERED PLENARY STATEMENT ON OCT 14 CRITICIZING SOVIET POSITION ON ENTRY INTO FORCE AND REITERATING US COMPROMISE PROPOSAL. SOVIETS HAVE SO FAR NOT ADDRESSED ISSUE IN PLENARY. IN PRIVATE CONTACTS, THEY HAVE GIVEN STRONG INDICATIONS THAT, ALTHOUGH THEY ARE UNLIKELY TO MOVE ON THIS MATTER UNTIL

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PNE AND VERIFICATION ISSUES ARE RESOLVED, THEY WOULD ULTIMATELY BE ABLE TO FALL OFF THEIR REQUIREMENT FOR ADHERENCE BY ALL NUCLEAR POWERS. MOST DIRECT INDICATION OF THIS WAS REMARK BY SOVIET DEPUTY TIMERBAEV TO US DELOFF (PHELPS) OCTOBER 13. HE SAID THAT WHEN OTHER ISSUES ARE RESOLVED, ENTRY INTO FORCE "WOULD BE NO

PROBLEM."

11. DIFFERENCES HAVE SURFACED AMONG THE DELS ON SCHEDULING QUESTIONS. SOVIETS WOULD LIKE TO CONTINUE PRESENT ROUND UNTIL LATE NOVEMBER WITH ABOUT ONE WEEK OFF FOR THEIR NATIONAL HOLIDAY (NOV7). (MOROKHOV HAS TOLD US THAT THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT WOULD NEED A BREAK OF ABOUT 4 TO 6 WEEKS TO DEVELOP NEW POSITIONS.) PRESUMABLY, UNDER THEIR APPROACH, NEGOTIATIONS WOULD NOT RESUME UNTIL EARLY JANUARY. WE QUESTION NEED TO CARRY CURRENT ROUND INTO NOVEMBER ESPECIALLY IF CURRENT IMPASSE CONTINUES. IN OUR VIEW, CONTINUING THE ROUND ON THAT BASIS COULD CONVEY IMPRESSION TO SOV DEL THAT US DEL HAD FLEXIBILITY TO PURSUE PNE ISSUE FURTHER. WE WOULD THEREFOR PREFER THAT CURRENT ROUND CONCLUDE SOMETIME DURING WEEK OF OCTOBER 24 AND THAT NEGOTIATIONS RESUME AT
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A DATE TO BE AGREED THROUGH DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS. IF IT SUBSEQUENTLY APPEARS PROMISING, WE COULD THEN SCHEDULE THE NEXT ROUND TO BEGIN SOON AFTER THANKSGIVING. WARNKE

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